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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
To Be or Not to Be: The Validity of Pendent Party 
Jurisdiction Remains Unanswered After Finley v. 
United States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Supreme Court decided Finley v. United States/ most 
federal courts chose to exercise pendent party jurisdiction in Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA)2 actions when presented with the opportu-
nity to consolidate related claims in a single forum. 3 In contrast, Finley 
v. United States arose from the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to con-
sistently oppose pendent party jurisdiction in FTCA and all other fed-
eral actions.'' For more than a decade, the Supreme Court's dicta in 
Aldinger v. Howard5 fueled judicial debate on the validity of pendent 
party jurisdiction in FTCA actions. In Aldinger, the Court specifically 
named the FTCA as an example of a federal statute which might prop-
erly support a pendent party jurisdiction claim.6 While the 5-4 decision 
in Finley suggests that the Aldinger dicta was but one vote short of 
becoming law, the Court held that the FTCA does not permit the exer-
1. I 09 S. Ct. 2003 (1989). 
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1988). 
3. Cases allowing pendent party jurisdiction in FTCA actions include Brown v. United 
States, 838 F.2d 1157 (II th Cir. 1988) (affirming Lykins); Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645, 
64 7 (lith Cir. 1984) (there is "no express or implied negation of the federal courts' power to hear 
pendent party claims" in the FTCA); Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 
1982) (pendent party jurisdiction is proper under the FTCA since the "waiver of immunity, 
granting jurisdiction to the federal district courts of such tort suits against the Government, was 
made in sweeping language"); Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 1979) (joining 
additional parties to an FTCA action will not "contravene any congressional statute"). 
4. Ninth Circuit cases denying pendent party jurisdiction include Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. 
Corp. v. D & L Camp Constr. Co., 738 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1984); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982); Idaho ex rei. Trombley v. United States, 666 F.2d 444 
(9th Cir. 1982); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ninth Circuit does not 
recognize the existence of pendent party concept); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969). 
5. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). In Aldinger, the plaintiff tried to join Spokane County as an additional 
defendant to a claim against her employer based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), the Civil Rights 
Act. The Court held that the Civil Rights Act specifically excluded counties from liability and thus 
denied pendent party jurisdiction. /d. Two years after the Aldinger decision, the Court in Monell 
v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruled prior cases 
holding that municipal corporations are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
6. 427 U.S. at 18-19. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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cise of pendent party jurisdiction ov~r additional parties who have no 
independent basis of federal jurisdiction.7 
This casenote reviews the history and development of pendent 
party jurisdiction as a valid, essential judicial tool. Next follows an ex-
amination of the Court's reasoning for prohibiting pendent party juris-
diction in the FTCA context in Finley. The note then explores the in-
consistencies between the Court's reasoning in Finley and its reasoning 
in past pendent party decisions. Finally, the note examines the signifi-
cance of the holding in the application of pendent party jurisdiction to 
other federal claims. 
II. HISTORY OF PENDENT PARTY jURISDICTION 
A. Definition and Debate 
For years federal courts have struggled with the application of 
pendent party jurisdiction, a judicially-created concept which evolved 
from pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.8 Pendent, ancillary and pen-
dent party jurisdiction all address the issue of whether federal courts 
may adjudicate nonfederal claims and/or claims involving nonfederal 
parties. 9 
Pendent jurisdiction allows a claimant to attach a related claim 
7. 109 S. Ct. at 2010. 
8. See, P.f(., Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) (allowed plaintiff 
to meet the diversity statute's $10,000 amount in controversy threshold by aggregating claims 
against two separate defendants); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 
1966) (also allowed aggregation of claims and multiple parties to meet the diversity amount in 
controversy threshold); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (allowed joinder 
of an additional plaintiff in diversity suit although plaintiff was not diverse from defendants). The 
Supreme Court refused to allow courts to use pendent jurisdiction to join parties together to meet 
the amount in controversy threshold for federal diversity in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 
U.S. 291 (1973). 
9. "A considerable body of recent literature suggests that there is no meaningful distinction 
between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction." Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supple-
mmtal jurisdiction, 34 DUKE L.J. 49 (1987) [hereinafter Freer] (citing Matasar, A Pmdent and 
Ancillary jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 103, 150-57 (1983); Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary jurisdiction: 
Tou•ard a Them)' of incidental jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1935, 1937 (1982); Comment, 
Pendent and Ancillary jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 
1263, 1271-87 (1985)). The Supreme Court has refused to distinguish among the different types 
of judicially-created federal jurisdiction: 
[W]e think it quite unnecessary to formulate any general, all-encompassing jurisdic-
tional rule. Given the complexities of the many manifestations of federal jurisdiction, 
together with the countless factual permutations possible under the Federal Rules, 
there is little profit in attempting to decide, for example, whether there are any "princi-
pled" differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. 
AldinKer, 427 U.S. at 13. But see Finle.y, 109 S. Ct. at 2007 ("We specifically disapproved appli-
cation of the Gibbs [pendent jurisdiction] mode of analysis [to pendent party jurisdiction in Ald-
inger] finding 'a significant legal difference.'" (citing Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15)). 
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with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction to a claim with 
proper basis so that all related claims against a defendant can be adju-
dicated in a single proceeding. 10 Ancillary jurisdiction allows a party 
to the suit, usually a third-party defendant, to assert a claim against 
another party to the suit after the original claim has been filed,n such 
as in "situations involving impleader, cross-claims or counterclaims." 12 
Pendent party jurisdiction is a hybrid, drawing from pendent jurisdic-
tion's claim-adding concept and ancillary jurisdiction's party-adding 
concept. Pendent party jurisdiction allows a party to the suit, usually a 
plaintiff, to assert a related state claim against a new party not named 
in the original federal suit. 13 
The pendent party jurisdiction debate pits the pragmatic propo-
nent against the theory-bound critic. Pendent party jurisdiction extols 
the practical virtues of convenience to litigants and consolidation of 
claims in an ever-crowded judicial system. Contrarily, opponents stand 
solidly behind the defense of federalism: federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction, and thus the adjudication of state claims among 
state parties is clearly beyond their constitutionally- and congression-
ally-granted powers. 14 
The pendent party jurisdiction issue takes on even greater signifi-
cance when the federal claim is a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
action. The FTCA mandates exclusive federal jurisdiction/5 forcing a 
claimant to split one lawsuit between state and federal court when it 
10. Note. Ferlnnl Pn/({1'1// Party jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs-Fnlnal Quntwn all!! Dn•rnity CasfS, 62 VA. L. RFV. 194, 195 n.2 (1976). 
11. /d. Neither pendent nor ancillary jurisdiction joins a new party to the suit. A pendent 
claim is one asserted in the complaint hy plaintiffs against defendants to the suit. In contrast, an 
ancillary claim is asserted usually by a nonplaintiff after the original complaint has been filed. /d. 
12. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 (1978). Ancillary jurisdiction 
requires that the relationship between the primary federal claim and the ancillary nonfederal 
claim be one of "logical dependence." /d. at 376. For example, "[a] third-party complaint depends 
at least in part upon the resolution of the primary lawsuit." /d. 
13. Sei' Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 6, 10. 
14. Krogrr, 437 U.S. at 374. "It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction. The limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or 
by Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded." !d. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1346lb) (1982). The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) reads as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together 
with the ljnited States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the Dis-
trict Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on 
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on or after January 1, 
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent 
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred. 
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includes other defendants in addition to the United States. 16 For many 
claimants, no choice of forum amounts to no choice but to abandon 
either the state or the federal claim if limited resources prevent them 
from pursuing both. Even if a claimant can finance two claims simulta-
neously, he or she must further contend with the effects of collateral 
estoppel and res judicat~ upon the claim adjudicated later in time. 17 
Indeed, these are the very concerns which prompted the creation of 
pendent party jurisdiction. 
B. Development 
Pendent jurisdiction is rooted in the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of article III, section 2 of the Constitution, the federal courts' fun-
damental grant of power over cases and controversies arising under the 
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 18 In the 1824 case 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States/9 the Supreme Court determined 
that federal court power over cases and controversies included authority 
to adjudicate "incidental nonfederal substantive questions" which con-
tain issues forming "an ingredient of the original cause" of action. 20 
The Court reasoned that "[t]here is scarcely any case, every part of 
which depends on the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United 
States."21 Osborn thus became the standard authority for the validity of 
16. SN Aldingrr, 427 U.S. at 18 ("When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclu-
sive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 
1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argu-
ment that only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together." (footnote omitted)); 
FinlP)', 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Biackmun, J., dissenting) ("Where, as here, Congress' preference for a 
federal forum for a certain category of claims makes the federal forum the only possible one in 
which the constitutional case may be heard as a whole, the sensible result is to permit the exercise 
of pendent-party jurisdiction. Aldinger imposes no obstacle to that result, and I would not reach 
out to create one."). 
17. Srr United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("[T]he weighty policies 
of judicial economy and fairness to parties reflected in rrs judicata doctrine [are] in themselves 
strong counsel for the adoption of a rule which would permit federal courts to dispose of the state 
as well as the federal claims."). 
18. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 states: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or 
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another state;-between Citizens of dif-
ferent States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects. 
19. 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
20. /d. at 822-23. 
21. /d. 
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pendent jurisdiction. 
Lower federal courts gradually expanded pendent jurisdiction, the 
addition of claims, into pendent party jurisdiction, the addition of par-
ties.22 After 1966, courts exercised pendent party jurisdiction with more 
confidence and frequency after the Supreme Court upheld pendent ju-
risdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,23 specifically noting in the 
opinion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "strongly encourage" 
the "joinder of claims, parties and remedies."24 Pendent party jurisdic-
tion, unlike pendent jurisdiction, was not created in the Supreme 
Court, and has had to fight for legitimacy through Supreme Court re-
view.25 In the pre-Finley case, Aldinger v. Howard, 26 the Supreme 
Court impliedly validated the existence of pendent party jurisdiction. It 
did not strike down the concept altogether, but simply denied applica-
tion of pendent party jurisdiction to a specific federal statute. The Ald-
inger Court held that the claimant could not join a county as an addi-
tional defendant in a Civil Rights Action27 because the Act expressly 
excluded counties from liability thereunder. 28 Similarly, the Court did 
not approve the addition of parties under an ancillary jurisdiction the-
ory in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger. 29 Therein, the 
Court held that the federal diversity statute30 did not allow the plaintiff 
to join a "new and independent" claim against a nondiverse third-party 
defendant. The Court reasoned that since the diversity statute is tradi-
tionally narrowly construed to require complete diversity, such a situa-
tion would contravene clear congressional intent. 31 
Aldinger and K rogn, together with the Gibbs pendent jurisdiction 
case, appeared to provide lower courts with a series of tests for deter-
mining whether pendent party jurisdiction properly could be applied to 
22. Srr 111jna note 8. 
23. 383 U.S. 715. Srr lltjna note 8. 
24. 383 U.S. at 724. 
25. Note, Prnrlnll Parlr jurisdirtion and Srrtiou 1983: Whm Has Congrrss 'By !utjJ!im-
tion Nrgatnf' jurisrlirtiou~, 14 FoRDHAM URII. L.J. 873, 898 (1986) [hereinafter By 
Implimtionj. 
26. Srr 111pra note 5 and accompanying text. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1'!82). 
28. Alrllllgn, 427 U.S. at 16. Ser supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
29. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1 '!82). 
31. Krogrr, 437 U.S. at 373-74. The Court reasoned: 
"Over the years Congress has repeatedly re-enacted or amended the statute conferring 
diversity jurisdiction, leaving intact this rule of complete diversity. Whatever may have 
been the original purposes of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, this subsequent his-
tory clearly demonstrates a congressional mandate that diversity is not I<J be available 
when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any defendant. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
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specific federal causes of action. Upon these precedents, most courts of 
appeals found pendent party jurisdiction proper in FTCA actions,32 
with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, which consistently held that 
pendent party jurisdiction simply did not exist. 33 While Finle_y '1'. 
United States settled the FTCA controversy, it left open, as before, the 
question of whether a federal statute exists which is amenable to pen-
dent party jurisdiction. 
III. Finley v. United States: FACTUAL SuMMARY 
On the night of November 11, 1983, Petitioner Barbara Finley's 
family was killed when their airplane struck electric transmission 
power lines owned by San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) and 
crashed. Finley originally filed an action in San Diego Superior Court 
against SDG&E for negligent placement of the transmission lines and 
against the City of San Diego for negligence in maintaining and oper-
ating the runway approach lights. 34 When Finley discovered that the 
FAA, not San Diego, was responsible for the runway lights, she filed 
an FTCA action against the United States and then tried to add 
SDG&E and San Diego as codefendants. San Diego and SDG&E filed 
indemnity actions against the United States in state court. 311 
The district court granted the motion to amend and chose to exer-
cise pendent party jurisdiction over the two additional defendants. 36 
The United States appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which summarily reversed. 37 Finley's subsequent appeal was 
granted certiorari. 38 U pan review, the Supreme Court affirmed, hold-
ing that the FTCA does not authorize the use of pendent party 
jurisdiction. 39 
32. Srr .\Upra note 3 and accompanying text. 
33. SrP 1UjJra note 4. 
34. 109 S. Ct. at 2005. 
35. lrl. 
36. The district court based its assertion of jurisdiction on Gibbs, "finding it 'clear' that 
'judicial economy and efficiency' favored trying the actions together and concluding that they arose 
'from a common nucleus of operative fact.'" !d. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. A-8 to A-9). 
37. M 
38. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988). 
39. 109 S. Ct. at 2010. 
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IV. THE SuPREME CouRT's REASONING 
A. GibfJs Test Inapplicable 
After the Supreme Court outlined a test for pendent jurisdiction in 
Gibbs,40 lower federal courts frequently applied it to determine whether 
claims involving pendent parties were sufficiently related to the federal 
claims to invoke jurisdiction. Likewise, Finley's attorneys relied upon 
Gibbs to demonstrate that Finley's claim against San Diego and 
SDG&E and her claim against the United States together comprised a 
single interrelated suit. They did not anticipate the Supreme Court's 
quick, blunt severance of pendent party jurisdiction from pendent juris-
diction. The Court flatly refused to extend the Gibbs approach to pen-
dent parties,41 noting that a " 'significant legal difference' " 42 exists be-
tween the two concepts. The Court dismissed the tight fit of the Gibbs 
test to the Finle)' facts as a demonstration that the added claims and 
original complaint had "'mere factual similarit[ies],' " 43 an insufficient 
basis for jurisdiction. 
B. Statutory Language Does Not Support jurisdiction 
When creating statutes, Congress does not always extend the 
power of the federal courts to the limits of the Constitution.44 To deter-
mine whether Congress intended the FTCA to support pendent parties, 
the Finley Court examined the jurisdiction-granting portion of the Act 
rather than assume that Congress had authorized full constitutional 
power. 46 
The FTCA mandates that " 'the district courts . . . shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States' " 
which allege that federal employees have committed tortious activity in 
the scope of their employment.46 Construing the FTCA jurisdictional 
40. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The Gibbs test mandated that (1) the federal claim must be 
substantial so as to solidly invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the state and federal 
claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"; and (3) the claimant would ordi-
narily expect the two claims to be tried together in the same proceeding. lrl. 
41. 109 S. Ct. at 2010. 
42. lrl at 2007. 
43. lrl at 2008. 
44. For example, while the Constitution requires only minimum diversity (at least one plain-
tiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states), the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
diversity statute, 26 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) as requiring complete diversity (no plaintiff and defend-
ant ran be citizens of the same state). Sn Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). This mean-
ing. however, is derived from implied congressional intent with a judicial gloss rather than from 
express congressional intent codified as statute. 
45. 109 S. Ct. at 2007. 
46. Irl. at 2005 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). 
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statute narrowly, the Court read the inclusion of the United States as 
defendant as an exclusion of any other defendants. Analogizing the nar-
row interpretation given the federal diversity statute language to the 
FTCA language, the Court reasoned, "Just as the statutory provision 
'between ... citizens of different States' has been held to mean citizens 
of different States and no one else, so also here we conclude that 
'against the United States' means against the United States and no one 
else. " 47 
C. Legislativl' History Devoid of /ntl'nt 
The Court also struck down Finley's attempt to infer FTCA ame-
nability to pendent party jurisdiction from legislative history. Finley 
argued that a 1948 statutory language change from " 'exclusive juris-
diction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim against 
the United States' " to " 'exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on 
claims against the United States' " implied a broadening of the court's 
jurisdiction to hear all claims within a civil action as long as the United 
States was a defendant to one claim. 48 However, the Court character-
ized the difference as a minor wording change rather than an express 
substantive change.49 Furthermore, the Court noted that legislative his-
tory from 1948 was not relevant to pendent party jurisdiction, since the 
concept "was not considered remotely viable until Gibbs" in 1966.110 
D. State Sovl'rl'ignty and Fl'dl'ralism 
In K rogl'r, the Court had recognized that the limitation of an ex-
clusive federal forum was a factor to consider in determining proper 
application of pendent party jurisdiction.51 However, in Finley, the 
Court retreated from that view and instead took a strong federalism 
stance. The Court abandoned judicial pragmatism in the face of a per-
ceived threat to state sovereignty, observing that " 'neither the conve-
nience of the litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice 
to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.' " 52 
47. !d. at 2008 (citations omitted). 
48. !d. at 2009 (emphasis in original). 
49. /d. "We have found no suggestion, much less a clear expression, that the minor reword-
ing at issue here imported a substantive change." /d. 
50. /d. at 2010. 
51. 437 U.S. at 376-77. 
52. 109 S. Ct. at 2008. 
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E. Charting a Clear Course for Congress 
Finally, the Finley Court bolstered its decision by declaring that 
the FTCA jurisdiction interpretation would reinforce the pattern of 
uniform interpretations the Court had established in Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co. ,53 Aldinger/'" and Kroger. 55 Finley, the Court rea-
soned, would give Congress "a background of clear interpretive rules" 
against which to legislate, "so that it may know the effect of the lan-
guage it adopts." 56 
Continuing in the vein of previous pendent party denials, the 
Court held that the FTCA, as a grant of jurisdiction over claims in-
volving a particular party, the United States, "does not itself confer 
jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties."117 
This holding, however, seems to defeat the very purpose of pendent 
jurisdiction. If a statute expressly authorizes the joinder of parties, as 
the Court requires, parties do not need to request an exercise of pen-
dent party jurisdiction. While the Court may have cleared the surface 
analysis of the issue for Congress and perhaps for the lower courts, it 
seems to have muddied the underlying purposes of the pendent party 
jurisdiction theory. That a statute would explicitly grant pendent party 
jurisdiction seems an oxymoron. After Finley, it remains to be seen 
which statutes, if any, support pendent party jurisdiction. 
V. ANALYSIS: INCONSISTENCIES IN THE COURT'S REASONING 
A. Aldinger Standard Abandoned Without Discussion 
With good reason, the Finley dissenters charged the new Court 
with essentially ignoring the test for pendent party jurisdiction the pre-
vious Court had fashioned over a 12-year period in the Gibbs-Aldinger-
K roger line of cases. "The Court's holding is not faithful to our prece-
dents and casually dismisses the accumulated wisdom of our best 
judges," wrote Justice Stevens. 118 
Indeed, the majority opinion did not "so much as acknowledg[ e ]" 
the Aldingn holding, which designated the test for pendent party juris-
diction to be whether Congress had expressly or impliedly negated the 
53. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Therein, the Court determined that in a class action, each plaintiff 
individually had to satisfy the $10,000 minimum claim requirement of the diversity statute and 
that plaintiffs could not satisfy the minimum by grouping together their claims to add up to 
$10,000. /d. ill 301. 
54. 427 l · S. 1 (1 'J76). Sl'f supra note 5. 
55. 417 t.:.s. :\65 (1978). 
56. 109 S Ct. at 2010. 
57. Jrl. 
58. 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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existence of pendent party jurisdiction for a particular statute.119 
Rather, the FinlPy Court required the inverse of that test, that there be 
an exprpss affirmation of party joinder, not a impliPd nPgation. The 
difference may mean the demise of the pendent party jurisdiction 
theory. 60 
FinlPy and the pendent party jurisdiction issues seem to have been 
decided in a vacuum. That is, the Court seemed to commit the same 
flaw it pointed out to Finley in attempting to justify pendent party ju-
risdiction in a legislative history that could not possibly have intended 
the concept. 61 The intent of the jurisdiction-granting portion of the 
FTCA was not to exclude certain parties from litigation in federal 
court; rather, it was to exclude state courts from adjudicating tort cases 
against the United States.62 
In requiring express affirmation rather than implied negation, the 
Court now seems to expect the legislature to build into each federal 
statute a judicially-created concept. However, if Congress designs a 
statute expressly authorizing joinder of additional parties, the purpose 
of pendent party jurisdiction is defeated and the need for it dissipates. 63 
By definition, pendent party jurisdiction is invoked only in thf' absmce 
of such a grant.64 
In short, FinlPy leaves open the question of whether pendent party 
jurisdiction exists at all. The Court has developed an analysis that nec-
essarily reaches a predestined end, rendering the analysis itself a futile 
59. !d. at 2010 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976); srr id. (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("If .4/din{.;rr I'. Hou•ard required us to ask whether the Federal Tort Claims Act 
embraced 'an ajjinnatii•r grant of pendent-party jurisdiction, I would agree with the majority that 
no such specific grant of jurisdiction is present. But, in my view, that is not the appropriate 
question under Aldinwr.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the problems 
the Aldin{.;N test elicits, see Freer, supra note 9; By Implication, supra note 25; Bagwell, Frdrral 
Prndmt Party juri.sdiction and Pnulrncy in Dil•rrsity Casrs, 38 ALA. LAw. 333 (1977). 
60. Finlry. 109 S. Ct. at 2011. 
61. In requiring courts to review legislative history for an indication of congressional intent 
to allow or deny pendent party jurisdiction, "[t]he Court has sanctioned an ad hoc search of legis-
lative intent despite the rather obvious fact that Congress, in passing the general jurisdictional 
statutes, has never expressly considered supplemental jurisdiction." Freer, supra note '>. 
62. In statutory interpretation, courts are to presume that concurrent jurisdiction exists un-
less the presumption is rebutted by explicit statutory language, unmistakable implied intent from 
legislative history, or clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests. 
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876). 
63. Finlr)', I 09 S. Ct. at 2019 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
64. Justice Blackmun argued that the statutory "affirmative grant of pendent-party jurisdic-
tion" the majority required in Finlry does not make sense like the Aldin{.;rr "express or implied 
negation" test. "[T]he Aldingrr test would be rendered meaningless if the required intent could be 
found in the failure of the relevant jurisdictional statute to mention the type of party in question, 
'because all instances of asserted pendent-party jurisdiction will by definition involve a party as to 
whom Congress has impliedly "addressed itseir' by not expressly conferring subject-matter juris-
diction on the federal courts.'" /d. at 2010-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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effort. If the Court's purpose was to require express jurisdiction, it 
could have simply invalidated the concept of pendent party jurisdiction 
in a matter of sentences. 
B. Diversity v. Federal Question: Gibbs Application 
The majority fails to distinguish between diversity and federal 
question cases in the pendent party jurisdiction issue. 611 The diversity 
statute expressly negates the addition of nondiverse parties. 66 Con-
versely, federal question cases do not require each defendant to have an 
independent basis of jurisdiction; instead, the focus is on the type of 
case or controversy.67 
Contrary to the Court's opinion, the Gibbs test is especially appli-
cable in federal question cases. In Aldinger, the Court found the pen-
dent jurisdiction issue in Gibbs to be legally and factually different 
from the pendent party issue.68 However, in that same opinion, the 
Court espoused that pendent party claims should be analyzed under the 
Gibbs article III test and the Aldinger congressional intent test: 
"Before it can be concluded that such jurisdiction exists, a federal court 
must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in 
the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication 
negated its existence."69 Likewise, in Kroger, the Court stated: "The 
Aldinger and Zahn cases thus make clear that ... the test of Gibbs, 
does not end the inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear 
the nonfederal claims along with the federal ones."70 
Thus, Gibbs is not inapplicable to pendent party jurisdiction; it is 
one-half of an essential test to determine constitutional and congres-
sional intent. Since federal question jurisdiction turns on the nature of 
the case or controversy, it makes more sense first to apply the Gibbs test 
to determine whether all of the claims and parties comprise a single 
case or controversy and then to apply the Aldinger test to check for 
congressional negation, rather than simply to search for a nonexistent 
affirmative legislative intent, as the Finley test mandates.71 Such a 
holding would have been consistent with the Court's earlier finding 
65. !d. at 2018. 
66. SPr supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
67. Freer, wpra note 9, at 63. 
68. Aldinwr, 427 U.S. at 14-15. 
69. !d. at 18. 
70. Krop;n. 437 U.S. at 373. 
71. Where state-law claims against a pendent party are joined to FTCA actions, "the fact 
that such claims are within the exclusive federal jurisdiction, together with the absence of any 
evidence of congressional disapproval of the exercise ... , provides a fully sufficient justification 
for applying the holding of Gibbs to this case." 109 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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that it is reasonable to assume that "Congress did not intend to confine 
the jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to 
protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined 
lawsuit."72 
C. Implications for Other Federal Statutes 
1. Strict interpretations analogous to FTCA language 
Finley has provided a clear-albeit narrow and theoretically non-
sensical-test for determining whether a statute supports pendent party 
jurisdiction. That is, courts interpreting statutes which refer to either 
particular types of defendants or particular types of plaintiffs often find 
that Finley has clearly negated pendent party jurisdiction. Two recent 
examples are the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),73 which is 
aimed at railroad defendants, and the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RIC0),74 aimed at plaintiffs injured by spe-
cific RICO violations. 
In Lockard v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. ,7r. the Eighth Circuit 
strictly analogized the Finley interpretation of the FTCA jurisdiction 
grant-"against the United States and no one else"76-to the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act (FELA) when the pendent party was not a 
railroad.77 The court held that FELA expressly negates pendent party 
jurisdiction because it provides that "( e )very common carrier by rail-
road . . . shall be liable" and that "( u )nder this chapter an action may 
be brought in a district court of the United States."78 It reasoned that 
this statutory language was "a grant of jurisdiction over claims involv-
ing particular parties," which extended to railroads and no one else.79 
Similarly, in Hall American Center Associates v. Dick,80 the district 
court did not allow plaintiffs whose federal RICO claims were dis-
missed to remain in federal court to pursue state contract law claims, 
noting that the language of RICO "confers jurisdiction over persons 
72. Kroga, 437 U.S. at 377. 
73. Sff 45 U.S.C. §§51, 56 (1981). 
74. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-86 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
75. 894 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1990). 
76. Finln, 109 S. Ct. at 2008. 
77. 894 F.2d at 302. 
78. Finlry, 109 S. Ct. at 2008 (citation omitted). 
79. Lockard, 894 F.2d at 302. Sn Ezell v. Burlington N.R.R., 724 F. Supp. 863, 865 (D. 
Wyo. 1989) (Court denied pendent party jurisdiction over nonrailroad in FELA action because 
"[p]laintiff does not allege that [defendant] fits the definition of a common carrier by railroad. The 
language of FELA clearly restricts the jurisdiction marked out by Congress to employee actions 
against common carriers by railroad."). 
80. 726 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citing Finlry, 109 S. Ct. at 2008). 
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injured by RICO violations and only over those persons-'no one 
else.' " 81 
2. Interpretations based upon Finley dicta 
After 1976, most federal courts followed the Aldinger dicta which 
clearly suggested that the FTCA may support pendent party jurisdic-
tion.82 The dicta proved unreliable. As in Aldinger, the Finley Court 
suggested examples of statutory language which might support pendent 
parties. The Court stated that jurisdiction-granting statutes which read 
" 'civil actions on claims that include requested relief against the 
United States' " and " 'civil actions in which there is a claim against 
the United States'" may indicate minimum rather than maximum ju-
risdiction requirements. 83 
Acting upon this dicta, the Ninth Circuit, in a direct about-face, 
granted pendent party jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act (FSIA)84 in Teledyne, Inc. v. Kane Corp. 86 The FSIA pro-
vides for district court jurisdiction over "any non jury civil action against 
a foreign state,"86 language the court found "virtually indistinguish-
able" from the examples given in Finley. 
Likewise, in Rodriguez v. Comas,87 the First Circuit determined 
that the Civil Rights Act88 allowed the joinder of plaintiff's wife as a 
pendent party plaintiff.89 The statute grants jurisdiction over "any civil 
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person"90 and the 
substantive portion does not exclude plaintiff's wife. The court found 
the section 1983 language a "broadly worded jurisdictional grant" 
81. The RICO jurisdiction-granting portion of the statute provides that "[a]ny person injured 
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor 
in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee" 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
82. SPP supra note 16. 
83. 109 S. Ct. at 2008. 
84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d) (1985). 
85. 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990). 
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The Ninth Circuit also relied upon legislative history which "sug-
gest[ed] that the plain language of the FSIA accurately reflects Congressional'intent." 892 F.2d at 
1409-10. For example, the House Report states that a foreign state may remove FSIA actions to 
federal court even if there are multiple defendants and some of them do not want removal or are 
citizens of the state in which the action has been brought. /d. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976)). 
87. 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989). 
88. SPP supra note 27. 
89. "Unlike the party in Aldingn, [pendent party plaintiff wife] is not a party specifically 
excluded from actions brought under Section 1983 claims." 888 F.2d at 905. 
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a). 
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which properly included pendent parties.91 
Two questions stem from the application of FinlPJ to other stat-
utes. First, is the Supreme Court dicta reliable? If reliability is mea-
sured by retaining the same justices on the Court, the dicta can be 
trusted for the duration of the present Court. The 5-4 FinlPy vote 
seems to assure only that the future of the issue remains open to 
change. Second, if the statute authorizes the addition of parties, does 
the joining of parties constitute pendent party jurisdiction or simply 
original jurisdiction? At least one court has concluded from FinlPy that 
pendent party jurisdiction "apparently is no longer a viable concept."92 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
Federal courts developed the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction 
to bridge the gap between the narrower congressional grant of jurisdic-
tion and the broader constitutional grant of power when one complex 
case or controversy demands adjudication in a single forum. Fin!Py 
neither recognizes the gap nor the need to overcome it. Instead, the 
Supreme Court has fashioned a circular test for determining the pro-
priety of pendent party jurisdiction. That is, finding an express grant of 
jurisdictional power negates the very need for pendent party jurisdic-
tion: the effort to move through an analysis leads the analyst nowhere 
except to return to the concept of original jurisdiction. 
The future for the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction under 
other federal statutes is unclear and uncharted. While the Supreme 
Court has given examples of statutory language which may support 
pendent parties, that language is dicta to which the Court may or may 
not adhere in the future. While it appears that federal statutes do exist 
which appear to meet the new FinlPy standard, it is not clear if pendent 
party JUrisdiction remains a necessary bridge over the gap between con-
gressional and constitutional jurisdiction or whether it has been obliter-
ated and absorbed into the concept of original jurisdiction. 
Janis T. But/a 
91. 88il F.2d at 906. 
92. Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 n.S (2d Cir. 1989); Itt LanR'ton v. 
Bottlewerks, Inc., No. 89 C 5747 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1989) (summarizing Fi11/ey as "rcjcctinr; 
doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction"). 
